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EVIDENCE-ADMISSiBILITY OF THE VICTIM'S PAST SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
UNDER WASHINGTON'S RPPE EVIDENCE LAW-WASH. REV. CODE §
9.79.150 (1976)
In 1975, Washington enacted a comprehensive revision of its laws
governing sex crimes.' The new legislation includes provisions which
limit the admissibility at trial of the past sexual behavior of the victim
of a sexual offense.2 Under R.C.W. § 9.79.150(2) and (3), the admis-
1. The new legislation, effective September 8, 1975, defined consent, WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.79.140(6) (1976), expanded the definition of sextial intercourse, id. §
9.79.140(1), and forcible compulsion, id. § 9.79.140(5), and divided rape into three
degrees, id. §§ 9.79.170-.190. It also codified cases such as State v. Morden, 87 Wash.
465, 151 P. 832 (1915), and State v. Davis, 20 Wn. 2d 443, 147 P.2d 940 (1944),
which held that a defendant may be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of
the victim. WASH. REV. "CODE § 9.79.150(1) (1976). In addition, the new legislation
spelled out the circumstances in which the victim's sexual history may be admissible
as evidence at trial. Id. § 9.79.150(2)-(4). For a recent survey and analysis of rape
laws governing the admissibility of the victim's past sexual history, see Rudstein, Rape
Shield Laws: Some Constitutional Problems, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1976). For
a summary of the current status of rape legislation in each state, see Battelle Law and
Justice Study Center, Forcible Rape: An Analysis of Legal Issues (December 1976)
(unpublished draft report prepared for the National Institute of Law Enforcement
and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department
of Justice, on file at Washington Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Battelle Legal
Analysis].
Congress is also considering a bill sponsored by Representative Elizabeth Holtzman
which would amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to restrict the use of the victim's
past sexual behavior in rape cases. H.R. 6491, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). This bill
would completely prohibit the use of reputation or opinion evidence and would allow
evidence of specific instances of past sexual behavior in two situations: sexual behavior
with someone other than the accused to identify the source of pregnancy, disease,
semen, or injury; or behavior with the accused, to determine whether the victim con-
sented.
2. The statute provides in part:
(2) Evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior including but not limited to
the victim's marital history, divorce history, or general reputation for promis-
cuity, nonchastity, or sexual mores contrary to community standards is inadmis-
sible on the issue of credibility and is inadmissible to prove the victim's consent
except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, but when the perpetrator and
the victim have engaged in sexual intercourse with each other in the past and
when the past behavior is material to the issue of consent, evidence concerning
the past behavior between the perpetrator and the victim may be admissible on
the issue of consent to the offense.
(3) In any prosecution for the crime of rape or for an attempt to commit, or
an assault with an intent to commit any such crime evidence of the victim's past
sexual behavior including but riot limited to the victim's marital behavior, divorce
history, or general reputation for promiscuity, nonchastity, or sexual mores con-
trary to community standards is not admissible if offered to attack the credibility
of the victim and is admissible on the issue of consent only pursuant to the fol-
lowing procedure:
(a) A written pretrial motion shall be made by the defendant to the court and
prosecutor stating that the defense has an offer of proof of the relevancy of evi-
dence of the past sexual behavior of the victim proposed to be presented and its
relevancy on the issue of the consent of the victim.
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sibility of evidence of the victim's sexual history depends upon the
purpose for which it is offered. It is inadmissible to impeach the vic-
tim's credibility. It may be admissible to prove that the victim con-
sented to the defendant if the judge, in a pretrial hearing, finds that
the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. 3
Although R.C.W. § 9.79.150 deals with many sex crimes, this note
is limited to its application in forcible rape cases. 4 Part I examines
(b) The written motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit or affidavits in
which the offer of proof shall be stated.
(c) If the court finds that the offer of proof is sufficient, the court shall order
a hearing out of the presence of the jury, if any, and the hearing shall be closed
except to the necessary witnesses, the defendant, counsel, and those who have a
direct interest in the case or in the work of the court.
(d) At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds that the evidence pro-
posed to be offered by the defendant regarding the past sexual behavior of the
victim is relevant to the issue of the victim's consent; is not inadmissible because
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admis-
sion will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice; and that its exclusion
would result in denial of substantial justice to the defendant; the court shall make
an order stating what evidence may be introduced by the defendant, which order
may include the nature of the questions to be permitted. The defendant may
then offer evidence pursuant to the order of the court.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit cross-examination of
the victim on the issue of past sexual behavior when the prosecution presents
evidence in its case in chief tending to prove the nature of the victim's past sexual
behavior, but the court may require a hearing pursuant to subsection (3) of this
section concerning such evidence.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.150(2)-(4) (1976).
3. In State v. Cosden, 18 Wn. App. 213, 568 P.2d 802 (1977), a recent case
construing R.C.W. § 9.79.150, the Washington Court of Appeals made it clear that.
although the statute deals only with past sexual behavior offered to prove credibility
or consent, the victim's sexual behavior may be relevant on other issues, and thus
may be admissible on those issues subject to the balancing process outlined in sub-
section (3)(d) of the statute. In Cosden, the defendant denied that he had had inter-
course with the victim. He wished to introduce evidence of the victim's act of inter-
course with another person within four days prior to the rape; not to prove consent.
but to explain the presence of semen in the victim's body. The trial court ruled that
the evidence was inadmissible because it did not tend to prove that the victim had
consented. The court of appeals stated: "The trial court assumed, incorrectly we
think, that evidence of prior sexual behavior of a prosecuting witness in a rape case
may be allowed under R.C.W. 9.79.150 only on the issue of consent, and within the
guidelines prescribed in subsection (d)." 18 Wn. App. at 218, 568 P.2d at 806 (em-
phasis added). In a case such as this, "[w] here the defendant denies any sexual con-
tact with the victim, yet the post-rape medical tests show evidence of a recent sexual
contact, then all recent sexual contacts which could account for those testing results
become highly relevant on the issue of defendant's responsibility for the crime." Id.
at 219, 568 P.2d at 806. The court of appeals concluded that the evidence should
have been subjected to the statutory balancing test to determine admissibility, but, in
view of other evidence supporting the victim's version of the facts and the defendant's
failure to lay a proper foundation for the evidence, the exclusion was not prejudicial
error.
4. For purposes of this note the term "forcible rape" will be used in contradistinc-
tion to statutory rape and will encompass all nonconsensual sexual intercourse with a
person not the spouse of the perpetrator. All three degrees of rape under the new
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various exclusionary rules of evidence" in order to develop a frame-
work for analysis of Washington's new law. Part II discusses the rele-
vance of the victim's sexual history to her 5 credibility as a witness; it
concludes that the complete exclusion of past sexual history to attack
credibility may be unconstitutional under the United States Supreme
Court holding in Davis v. Alaska.6 On the other hand, Part III sug-
gests that R.C.W. § 9.79.150 should be redrafted to limit further the
use of sexual history to prove consent. Conceding that a past sexual
encounter between the victim and the defendant may be sufficiently
probative of consent to overcome the prejudiciaLeffects of the evi-
dence, 7 Part III argues that this is not the case when past behavior
Washington law fall within this definition. In Washington, "forcible compulsion" is
an element of first and second degree rape. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.170(1), .180(1)(a)
(1976). "Forcible compulsion" is defined as "physical force which overcomes
resistance, or a threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of death or
physical injury to herself or himself or another person, or in fear that she or he or
another person will be kidnapped." Id. § 9.79.140(5). Third degree rape does not re-
quire forcible compulsion, but only lack of consent by the victim. Id. § 9.79.190(l)(a).
The statute defines consent to mean that "at the time of the act of sexual inter-
course there are actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement to have
sexual intercourse." Id. § 9.79.140(6). In contrast, the FBI defines forcible rape as
"the carnal knowledge of a female through the use of force or the threat of force."
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED
STATES 22 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS].
5. Although the new law provides for both heterosexual and homosexual rape by
describing sexual intercourse as an act "committed on one person by another, whether
such persons are of the same or opposite sex," WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.140(l)(b)
(1976), this note will assume the more common state of affairs: a female victim and
a male perpetrator.
6. 415 U.S. 308 ('1974).
7. In most jurisdictions, evidence that the victim previously consented to inter-
course with the defendant has been held admissible to raise an inference that the vic-
tim consented in the case at bar. Annot., 140 A.L.R. 364, 390 (1942). Dean Wig-
more discussed the reason why conduct with the defendant has generally been ad-
mitted: "Such conduct is not intended to show a general willingness or disposition to
commit acts of unchastity, but merely an emotion towards the particular defendant
tending to allow him to repeat the liberty; it is thus not only more cogent as evi-
dence, but is not open to the objections advanced against evidence of intercourse with
third persons." I J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF Evi-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 200, at 688 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis added).
See also 2 id. §§ 399, 402.
Washington's new statute provides: "when the perpetrator and the victim have en-
gaged in sexual intercourse with each other in the past, and when the past behavior
is material to the issue of consent, evidence concerning the past behavior between the
perpetrator and the victim may be admissible on the issue of consent to the offense."
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.150(2) (1976). The language of the statute creates possible
confusion over whether past sexual behavior with the perpetrator must be screened
by the procedural requirements of R.C.W. § 9.79.150(3)(a)-(d). Subsection (3),
which describes the screening procedure, does not specifically mention past sexual be-
havior with the perpetrator, and the language in subsection (2) appears to exclude
this behavior from the procedural requirements. The statute will probably be interpreted
to mean that past sexual behavior with the perpetrator is also subject to the procedural
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with others is offered to prove consent to the defendant. The note
concludes that past sexual conduct with third parties may be constitu-
tionally excluded on the issue of consent.
I. THE THEORY BEHIND RULES OF EXCLUSION
Evidence may be excluded for one of two reasons: it may be irrele-
vant, or it may be relevant but inadmissible on public policy grounds.
If exclusion of relevant evidence would deny the defendant his consti-
tutional right to confront a witness against him, the evidence may be
admissible notwithstanding public policy.
A. Relevance
Relevance is the threshold requirement for admissibility. To be
relevant, evidence must meet two tests: (1) it must help to prove or
disprove a particular proposition, and (2) that proposition must be at
issue in the case.8 The courts have held a rape victim's sexual history
to be relevant for two purposes: to impeach the victim's credibility
and to prove her consent. In both instances, the evidence clearly
passes the second of the two relevance tests: the victim almost always
takes the stand in a rape trial, thereby placing her credibility at issue,
and most rape statutes make lack of consent by the victim an element
of the crime, thus placing consent at issue. 9 However, if sexual history
requirements in subsection (3). Subsection (2) states that sexual history with the
perpetrator "may be admissible on the issue of consent," implying the exercise ofjudi-
cial discretion, and subsection (3) arguably includes any evidence of past sexual be-
havior offered to prove consent, whether with the perpetrator or with others. The
Washington Court of Appeals, construing R.C.W. § 9.79.150 in State v. Blum, 17 Wn.
App. 37, 561 P.2d 226 (1977), stated: "In situations other than where the victim and
the accused have engaged in sexual intercourse in the past, evidence of past sexual
behavior is inadmissible to show consent except as provided in subsection (3) of the
statute." Id. at 45, 561 P.2d at 230. The court did not address the issue of whether
past sexual behavior with the defendant is also subject to the screening process.
8. James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L.. REV. 689, 691 (1941).
The Federal Rules define relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EvID.
401. Though the Federal Rules have not been adopted for Washington courts, this
formulation is in accord with Washington rulings requiring materiality plus minimal
probative value for admissibility. See 5 R. MEISENHOLDER, WASHINGTON PRACTICE
Evidence § 1 (1965).
9. See note 77 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the extent to which
the new rape statutes in Washington remove consent as an element of the crime.
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does not make the victim's credibility or consent more or less probable
then it fails the first of the two relevance tests and should be excluded.
B. Public Policy
Relevant evidence is excluded on public policy grounds when a
court determines that it could have detrimental effects outweighing its
probative value. Although it is generally defendants who avail them-
selves of exclusionary rules,10 the policies underlying most such rules
may also justify exclusion of evidence on behalf of witnesses. As a
general policy, courts wish to encourage witnesses to come forward
and testify, but once on the stand, a witness may be impeached by at-
tacks upon his or her character.11 If a party were allowed to delve
into all aspects of the witness' past for impeachment purposes, few
people would be willing to come forward. Accordingly, most courts
limit the scope of the inquiry to the witness' reputation for truth
and veracity, and prohibit inquiry into specific acts of misconduct by the
witness. 12 In so doing, they not only prevent "terror of the witness box"
but also reduce the confusion attendant upon -the introduction of col-
lateral issues and assure that relevant information necessary to reach
an accurate verdict will be heard.1 3
If the witness has been convicted of a crime, most courts will allow
10. The most dramatic example is the exclusionary rule in criminal prosecutions,
designed to deter unconstitutional searches, seizures, and interrogations by police.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (interrogations); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964) (seizures); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (searches). But
even where constitutional rights are not at stake, auxiliary policies operate to exclude
relevant evidence. For example, evidence of previous convictions may tend to increase
the likelihood that a defendant committed the crime for which he is being tried. Never-
theless, most courts will exclude evidence of this type because it is too prejudicial.
See, e.g., Michaelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469-(1948). For a discussion of the
general category of past acts of misconduct, see I J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 57. See
also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE- LAW OF EVIDENCE § 190 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972); FED. R. EvID. 404, Advisory Committee's Note. Courts exclude this evidence
because they fear a verdict based on a general assessment of the defendant's charac-
ter, rather than on the facts presented at trial. See I J. WIGMOna, supra note 7, § 57 and
cases'collected therein.
11. See 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §'921 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
12. See id. § 922.
13. These considerations of auxiliary policy are summed up in the prejudice rule
for federal courts, which states that "[a] Ithough relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
For a thorough discussion of each of the elements of the rule, see Dolan, Rule 403:
The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 220 (1976).
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evidence of the conviction as an exception to the general policy pro-
hibiting inquiry into specific acts of misconduct. 14 Many jurisdictions,
however, limit such evidence to crimes which have a bearing on
credibility 15 in the belief that convictions not meeting this criterion are
prejudicial and of minimal relevance, and may influence the jury to
disregard reliable testimony. 16
The arguments for excluding certain kinds of character evidence to
impeach witnesses apply a fortiori to the use of past sexual conduct to
impeach victims in rape cases. The rape victim often refuses to report
the crime or testify at trial because she fears embarrassment or retalia-
tion by the defendant.' 7 In addition, a major study has documented
14. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 43; 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1I, § 980.
15. There is great disagreement over which crimes may be admissible for impeach-
ment of witnesses. California allows conviction of a felony. CAL. EvID. CODE § 788
(West 1966). Other jurisdictions require that the crime involve "moral turpitude."
See examples in C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 43. The Federal Rules allow evi-
dence of conviction of crimes "punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one
year" or involving "dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.-
FED. R. EVID. 609. In criminal trials, Washington allows evidence of conviction of
felonies and misdemeanors, WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.040 (1976), and does not dis-
tinguish between crimes involving moral turpitude and those that do not. State v.
Martz, 8 Wn. App. 192, 197. 504 P.2d 1174, 1177, review denied, 82 Wn. 2d 1002
(1973) (AWOL conviction).
16. Cf. FED. R. EvID. 609, Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
(other felonies may be used to impeach if the probative value outweighs the pre-
judicial effects).
17. "[L] aw enforcement administrators recognize that [forcible rape] is probably
one of the most under-reported crimes due primarily to fear and/or embarrassment
on the part of the victims." 1975 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 4, at 22, 24.
Although the percentage of unreported rapes is usually conceded to be high in rela-
tion to other crimes, the very factors which cause rape to be unreported make it
difficult to arrive at the exact percentage of unreported rapes. In the Seattle/King
County area, researchers from the Battelle Institute conducted a survey of rape
victims as part of an ongoing study of how the criminal justice system responds to
rape. They contacted rape victims primarily through media solicitation. The research-
ers completed 46 victim interviews during April and May of 1975. Ninety-two percent
of the responding victims were white and 96% were over 18 years old. Of the 46
cases, 30% of the women did not report the crime to the police. Battelle Human
Affairs Research Centers, Discretionary Grant No. 75-NI-99-0015, Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration, Research and Development of Model Procedures for
Criminal Justice System Involvement with the Crime of Forcible Rape, Appendices
to Third Quarter and National Advisory Panel Report, at 123 (1975) (unpublished
report on file at Battelle Institute, Seattle, Washington) [hereinafter cited as Battelle
Third Quarter Appendices]. Compare a similar survey in Washington, D.C., which
found that one-third of all rapes were unreported. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
FREE SOCIETY 21 (1967).
In the Seattle study, the following reasons for not reporting a rape were most
commonly given (multiple responses were accepted):
Fear of treatment by police/prosecutors 57%
Fear of trial procedures 43%
Fear of publicity/embarrassment 36%
1016
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manifestly unfair jury verdicts resulting from unduly influential evi-
dence of the victim's sexual history.' 8 Nevertheless, most jurisdictions
have allowed inquiry into the victim's sexual history in rape cases as
an exception to the general rule limiting impeachment evidence to
reputation for truth and veracity.' 9
C. Constitutionality
Although public policy may support exclusion of relevant informa-
tion in many cases, the court's basic obligation to provide a fair trial
to the defendant is an important countervailing consideration. The
concept of a fair trial is grounded in the fourteenth amendment due
process clause and in specific procedural safeguards of the Bill of
Rights deemed part of due process in state courts through incorpora-
tion.20 One such procedural safeguard is the sixth amendment right of
the accused to be confronted with the witnesses against him.2'
The right to confrontation is, in essence, the right of a criminal de-
fendant to cross-examine opposing witnesses; 22 its purpose is to help
assure the "integrity of the fact-finding process. '23 But the Supreme
Court in Chambers v. Mississippi24 indicated that "the right to con-
front and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate
cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal
trial process." 25 Unfortunately, the Court has not identified the "legiti-
mate interests" that override the right to confrontation, nor the "ap-
Procedures too time consuming 36%
Fear of reprisal from offender 36%
Battelle Third Quarter Appendices, supra at 123.
18. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 251 (1966). The authors note
that rape ranks second to murder in defendant preference for ajury trial. Id. at 26.
19. For a full discussion, see notes 32 & 33 and accompanying text infra.
20. Incorporation is the process by which various Bill of Rights guarantees have
been deemed to be part of the fourteenth amendment. Although a majority of the
Supreme Court has never supported the "total incorporation" approkch which holds
that all Bill of Rights guarantees are incorporated within the fourteenth amendment,
over the years the Court has selectively incorporated more and more-of-the specifics
of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana
391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).
21. The sixth amendment right to confrontation was held incorporated within the
fourteenth amendment and therefore binding upon the states in Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965).
22. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1965).
23. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965). Accord, Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
24. 410U.S. 284(1973).
25. Id. at 295.
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propriate cases" in which the right to confrontation must yield. 26 A
witness' fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination will
surely prevail over the defendant's right to confrontation,2 7 but statu-
tory privileges, hearsay rules, and the discretionary power of judges
may not.2 8
To summarize briefly, the validity of Washington's new rules for
excluding evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior turns on the rele-
vance of sexual history to both credibility and consent, the public pol-
icies favoring exclusion, and the constitutionality of exclusion.
II. CREDIBILITY
Prior to the enactment of rape legislation, there were two ways in
which defense attorneys could use the victim's sexual history to at-
tack her credibility in rape cases. They could present evidence of the
victim's lack of chastity on the theory that unchaste29 women are more
likely to tell lies. They could also argue that the victim's past sexual
behavior created a specific bias against the defendant or a reason for
the victim to lie about the facts of the case. 30 Obviously, defense coun-
26. In Chambers the Court cited Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972), as an
example of an "appropriate case." There, the witness was unavailable for cross-
examination because he had left the country, but his prior recorded testimony from
an earlier trial was admissible against the defendant, notwithstanding the unavailability
of the witness.
27. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694 (1931).
28. See generally Note, Constitutional Restraints on the Exclusion of Evidence in
the Defendant's Favor: The Implications of Davis v. Alaska, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1465
(1975).
29. The word "unchaste" was commonly used by early courts to denote the ci-
dition of women who engaged in intercourse without the sanction of marriage or who
engaged in extra-marital intercourse. See, e.g., State v. Gay, 82 Wash. 423, 428, 144
P. 711, 713 (1914). The judgmental character of the word is apparent in the discus-
sions of how unchastity was to be proved. Early courts referred specifically to acts of
"illicit intercourse" by the victim. State v. Holcomb, 73 Wash. 652, 658, 132 P. 416,
418 (1913). Later courts referred more ambiguously to "specific acts of misconduct."
State v. Severns, 13 Wn. 2d 542, 554, 125 P.2d 659, 664 (1942). Both expressions
imply moral condemnation. The term has fallen into disfavor and is rarely used by
modern Washington courts. In California, the legislature has gone so far as to ban
the expression "unchaste character" in rape prosecutions. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1127e
(West Supp. 1976).
30. One commentator lists sexual relations between a witness and a party in the
case as a possible source of partiality but points out that "[t] he kinds and sources of
partiality are too infinitely varied to be here reviewed." C. MCCORMICK, supra note
10, § 40, at 78. The same may be said of situations creating hostility toward the
defendant, or a motive to lie about the facts of the case. It is clear from illu-
strative cases, however, that bias is usually proved by evidence of specific conduct or
expressions by the witness, and not by general reputation evidence. See id. § 40, at
1018
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sel preferred the first approach because it entailed merely proving the vic-
tim's lack of chastity and allowing the jury to draw its own conclusions.
The argument that the victim's past sexual behavior with a third party
created a bias against the defendant is much more difficult to make. As
a result, case law on the use of the victim's sexual history has developed
around a general attack on credibility rather than a demonstration of
specific bias or motive. On its face, however, R.C.W. § 9.79.150 pro-
hibits both methods of impeachment because it bans all use of past
sexual history to attack credibility.31
A. General Truthfulness
A brief look at the evolution of Washington case law in the area
may shed some light on the intent of the legislature in enacting
R.C.W. § 9.79.150. Early Washington courts assumed without discus-
sion that a woman's lack of chastity had a bearing on her credibility.32
The only significant debate concerned permissible ways to prove her
lack of chastity. Washington courts allowed a defendant who wished
to attack the victim's credibility in a trial for forcible rape to intro-
duce the victim's general reputation for chastity, but not evidence of
specific acts of unchastity unless such acts were between the defendant
and the victim. 33 The inadmissibility of specific acts was not based on
78-79 nn.94-99 (cases collected therein).
In the rape context, at least one jurisdiction has accepted the argument that the
victim's past sexual activity with the defendant caused her to be biased against him.
Motley v. State, 207 Ala. 640, 93 So. 508 (1922) (illicit relations between victim and
defendant broken off shortly before alleged rape admissible to show her hostility
toward the defendant). Defense counsel seldom resort to the argument that sexual
activity with others creates a bias against the defendant, but at least one such argu-
ment was successful. Shoemaker v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. 518, 126 S.W. 887 (1910)
(when asked to refrain from intercourse with a boyfriend, prosecutrix threatened to
bring a retaliatory charge of rape against her sister's husband). Another example,
often posed but rarely substantiated, of sexual history creating a motive to lie is the
situation in which a woman brings a charge of rape against an innocent defendant
in order to explain a pregnancy resulting from a relationship with a third party.
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.150(2) (1976), quoted at note 2 supra.
32. State v. Godwin, 131 Wash. 591, 230 P. 831 (1924) (impeachment of statutory
rape victim by cross-examination as to prior chastity held to be a matter of right);
State v. Coella, 3 Wash. 99, 28 P. 28 (1891) (at a murder trial it was proper to inquire
whether a woman was a prostitute to impeach her credibility).
33. State v. Severns, 13 Wn. 2d 542, 125 P.2d 659 (1942); State v. Pierson, 175
Wash. 650, 27 P.2d 1068 (1933); State v. Gay, 82 Wash. 423, 144 P. 711 (1914)
(statutory rape); State v. Holcomb, 73 Wash. 652, 132 P. 416 (1913).
Initially, the rule was the same for both forcible and statutory rape, i.e., only evi-
dence of the victim's reputation for chastity was admissible; in later statutory rape
cases, however, a radically different rule developed. A 1924 decision held that when-
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relevancy grounds, but on policy grounds. This type of evidence was
considered collateral to the main issue and highly prejudicial to the
witness. 34
Later, the Washington Supreme Court declared that reputation evi-
dence of unchastity was inadmissible to attack credibility. 35 Although
the high court did not explain its change of position, a Washington
court of appeals case36 revealed that an important shift had taken
ever the testimony of the prosecuting witness was uncorroborated, the defendant could
cross-examine her regarding specific acts of unchastity as a matter of right. State
v. Godwin, 131 Wash. 591, 230 P. 831 (1924).
The court later reconsidered the statutory rape exception in State v. Linton, 36 Wn.
2d 67, 216 P.2d 761 (1950), and held that cross-examination of the victim as to
specific sexual acts was no longer a matter of right, but was within the discretion of
the trial court judge. Two years later, the court confused matters by reiterating the
Linton holding, but adding that reputation for unchastity was inadmissible. State v.
Wolf, 40 Wn. 2d 648, 652, 245 P.2d 1009, 1012 (1952). At that point the rule in
statutory rape cases was the exact opposite of the rule in forcible rape cases. The
Wolf rule was upheld in State v. Lampshire, 74 Wn. 2d 888, 891, 447 P.2d 727, 730
(1968) (in which the defendant woman argued that the reputation for chastity of the
male victim was not as important as that of a female and thus should be admissible).
and in State v. Dorrough, 2 Wn. App. 820, 470 P.2d 230 (1970). The latter provides
a good summary of the statutory rape cases.
34. The best statement of the policy reasons for limiting impeachment inquiry to
reputation evidence appears, not in a rape case, but in a case dealing with unlawful
possession of liquor. State v. Gaffney, 151 Wash. 599, 606-07, 276 P. 873, 875-76
(1929). Gaffney was cited in subsequent forcible and statutory rape cases. See, e.g.,
State v. Thomas, 8 Wn. 2d 573, 580, 113 P.2d 73, 76 (1941); State v. Pierson, 175
Wash. 650, 651, 27 P.2d 1068, 1069 (1933).
35. The statement appeared as dictum in an attempted rape case, State v. Simmons,
59 Wn. 2d 381, 368 P.2d 378 (1962), and later in a forcible rape case, State v. Allen,
66 Wn. 2d 641, 404 P.2d 18 (1965). The Simmons case is particularly dubious
precedent. The defendant was a superior court judge. His response to the charge
was to claim that the victim had consented and that police and prosecutors had con-
spired to "frame him." The case was reversed and remanded for misconduct in cross-
examination, but the court commented that "neither side had a monopoly on low
blows." 59 Wn. 2d at 387, 368 P.2d at 381.
The best analysis of the admissibility of reputation evidence of chastity appears in
the statutory rape cases. Because consent was not a defense to statutory rape, the only
way to get the victim's sexual history before the jury was by using it to attack her
credibility. In State v. Linton, 36 Wn. 2d 67, 216 P.2d 761 (1950), the Washington
Supreme Court cited authority which questioned the value of chastity evidence as an
indicator of veracity, while upholding the trial court's discretion to exclude the evi-
dence. Id. at 91-92. 216 P.2d at 776. In a later statutory rape case, the court specifical-
ly questioned the value of reputation evidence of chastity: "If the witness' reputation
for chastity is so bad that it has in some way affected his or her reputation for truth
and veracity, then the direct question can be asked as to reputation for truth and ver-
acity. If the witness' reputation for chastity has not produced this result, then the jury
should not be invited to make this deduction." State v. Wolf, 40 Wn. 2d 648, 653,
245 P.2d 1009, 1012 (1952).
36. State v. Geer, 13 Wn. App. 71, 533 P.2d 389, review denied, 85 Wn. 2d 1013
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place in the rationale for exclusion. The court of appeals stated that
exclusion was justified on relevancy grounds, not just on the basis of
prejudiciality and other policy considerations. Although the statement
was dictum, the court declared that neither reputation evidence nor
specific acts of unchastity were probative of credibility.37 R.C.W. §
9.79.150 essentially codified the case law and dicta in this area.38 It
draws no distinction between reputation evidence and specific sexual
acts, but excludes both for the purpose of attacking credibility.
B. Bias or Motive
There is only one Washington rape case dealing specifically with
the use of the victim's sexual history to show that she was biased or
had a motive to lie.39 There are, however, many cases dealing with the
(1975). In Geer, the defendant forced his way into the victim's house, held a hunting
knife to her forehead, and raped her. To attack the victim's credibility, and also to
show that she consented, the defendant wished to introduce evidence that she had
lived with a man who was not her husband, that she had an illegitimate child by him,
and that she had two other illegitimate children. Id. at 73, 533 P.2d at 391.
37. Id. at 74-75, 533 P.2d at 391.
38. No Washington forcible rape case has expressly held that the victim's general
reputation for chastity is irrelevant to attack general credibility; however, Geer did cite
with approval a statutory rape case standing for that proposition. Id. a't 74, 533 P.2d
at 391, (citing State v. Wolf, 40 Wn. 2d 648, 245 P.2d 1009 (1952)). In an earlier
attempted rape case, the Washington Supreme Court implied that the matter was de-
cided when it stated "we have ruled out such testimony as having no bearing on the
issue of veracity." State v. Simmons, 59 Wn. 2d 381, 387, 368 P.2d 378, 381 (1962).
39. State v. Blum, 17 Wn. App. 37, 561 P.2d 226 (1977). In the past, as long as
defense counsel could use the victim's sexual history to attack her general credibility
or to show that she had consented, there was no need to resort to an assertion that
her prior sexual conduct created a motive for her to perjure herself. If the traditional
avenues for admitting past sexual conduct are foreclosed, defense counsel are likely
to begin using the bias attack whenever possible in an attempt to get the information
before the jury. Restrictions on the admissibility of past sexual behavior may explain
the defendant's resort to the bias attack in State v. Blum. The prosecutrix in Blum
testified that the defendant yanked her from her bed, forcefully removed her clothes,
raped her repeatedly, and threatened her with death. Her testimony was corroborated
by evidence of scratches and bruises on her body, signs of a struggle in her room, and
her hysterical state when she first complained of the rape. The defendant wished to
introduce evidence of her past sexual relationship with his cousin to prove that she
had consented and, alternatively, to show that she was biased against members of the
defendant's family. The trial court ruled that the evidence was inadmissible for either
purpose and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that there had been no abuse of
discretion by the trial judge. Cf. People v. Hernandez, 63 Cal. App. 3d 381, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 753 (1976) (claim that prosecutrix had sex with the defendant to retaliate
against boyfriend for duping her into taking a non-narcotic injection was too specula-
tive to establish bias).
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kinds of evidence that can be used to show bias or motive on the part
of a witness. 40 Washington courts have traditionally been receptive to
bias attacks. Cross-examination to show bias, prejudice, or interest is
a matter of right, 41 subject only to the judge's discretion to exclude
evidence that is speculative or conjectural. 42 Evidence inadmissible to
attack general credibility may be admissible to establish bias or mo-
tive.43 The greatest leeway in cross-examination is allowed in criminal
cases, where the testimony of the witness is essential to the prosecu-
tor's case and the bulk of the evidence is circumstantial. 44
Rape cases present precisely the situation in which trial court
judges are most likely to allow wide-ranging cross-examination to es-
tablish bias or motive. Eyewitnesses to rape are rare, and the majority
40. See cases cited in note 43 infra. See generally R. MEISENHOLDER, 5 WASHINGTON
PRACTICE Evidence § 299 (1965). The bias attack proceeds on a different theory than
the general attack on credibility; namely, by recognizing "the slanting effect upon
human testimony of the emotions or feelings of the witness toward the parties or the
self-interest of the witness in the outcome of the case." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10,
§ 40, at 78. Bias, in other words, is likely to color the witness' testimony for or against
a specific defendant. In contrast, the general attack on credibility is aimed at character
or other defects of the witness having no relationship to the particular defendant. Sex-
ual history showing bias is therefore highly relevant to credibility, whereas sexual his-
tory in general is irrelevant on that point.
41. State v. Robbins, 35 Wn. 2d 389, 213 P.2d 310 (19501; State v. Wills, 3 Wn.
App. 643, 476 P.2d 711 (1970). Denial may be grounds for reversal. State v. Robbins,
35 Wn. 2d 389, 213 P.2d 310 (1950); State v. Eaid, 55 Wash. 302, 104 P. 275 (1909).
42. E.g., Dods v. Harrison, 51 Wn. 2d 446, 319 P.2d 558 (1957) (refusal to give
statement to police did not show bias against plaintiff); State v. Knapp, 14 Wn. App.
101, 540 P.2d 898 (1975); (evidence that defendant's brother wanted to put him in
jail was too nebulous to show bias against defendant).
43. State v. Temple, 5 Wn. App. 1, 485 P.2d 93 (1971) (juvenile records) (dic-
tum); State v. Wills, 3 Wn. App. 643, 476 P.2d 711 (1970) (dismissed murder
charge); State v. Tate, 2 Wn. App. 241, 469 P.2d 711 (1970) (previous guilty plea to
forgery). Only one Washington case deals with the use of past sexual activity of a
principal witness to prove she was biased. In State v. Robbins, 35 Wn. 2d 389, 213
P.2d 310 (1950) (auto theft), the court held that it was reversible error to prohibit
cross-examination of the defendant's ex-wife regarding her pregnancy by another man
while the defendant was in the Army. Even though the court recognized that this was
a specific act of misconduct impermissible to impeach her general credibility, it held
that "this should not deprive appellant of the opportunity of proving that transaction
and resultant bias." Id. at 397, 213 P.2d at 316.
44. State v. Wills, 3 Wn. App. 643, 476 P.2d 711 (1970) (where witness charged
with murder agreed to testify that defendant committed the murder, the defendant
should have been allowed to cross-examine the witness for bias as a matter of right);
State v. Tate, 2 Wn. App. 241, 469 P.2d 999 (1970) (witness' guilty plea to forgery
admissible to show motive, bias, self-interest, and hope for leniency, even though it
was not yet a conviction because a final order had not been entered). Tate is illustra-
tive of the practice in Washington: "Where a criminal case may stand or fall on the
jury's belief or disbelief of one witness, his credibility is subject to close scrutiny ....
[G] reat latitude is allowed in cross-examining an essential prosecution witness to show
motive for his testimony." Id. at 247, 469 P.2d at 1003.
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of rape cases rests upon the testimony of the prosecuting witness, to-
gether with available circumstantial evidence. 45 On the other hand,
situations in which the victim's past sexual activity with a third person
creates a motive for her to lie about a rape charge are probably unu-
sual. Given the paucity of case law on this point and the rarity of the
fact situation, it is not surprising that the drafters of R.C.W. §
9.79.150 failed to provide for this particular kind of impeachment.
Unfortunately, because the statute does not provide for the admission
of the victim's sexual history to prove bias, it may be constitutionally
defective. 46
C. Constitutionality
Two relatively recent cases help delineate the point at which the
power to exclude evidence must give way to the right to confrontation
and due process. In Chambers v. Mississippi, 47 the Court held that
combined application of the voucher rule48 and a particular hearsay
rule violated due process. In Davis v. Alaska,49 the Court held that the
enforcement of a statutory exclusionary rule denied the defendant his
45. The Battelle analysis of forcible rape complaints in Seattle reveals that wit-
nesses were available in 25.9% of all cases reported. Only a small percentage of
these, however, were eyewitnesses, as the following data indicate:
Eyewitness 6.2%
Corroborating-I.D. Info. 16.1%
Corroborating-no I.D. Info. 3.6%
Battelle Final Report (Law and Justice Study Center, Human Affairs Research Cen-
ter, Discretionary Grant No. 75-NI-99-0015, Law Enforcement Assistance Administra-
tion, Research and Development of Model Procedures for Criminal Justice Involve-
ment with the Crime of Forcible Rape, at 68-69 (Final Report Nov. 10, 1975) (un-
published report on file at Battelle Institute, Seattle, Washington). See also H. KALVEN
& H. ZEISEL, supra note 18, at 138, in which the authors found that in criminal cases
generally, eyewitnesses appeared in 25% of the prosecution cases and 1 I% of the de-
fense cases.
46. In State v. Blum, 17 Wn. App. 37, 45-46, 561 P.2d 226, 230-31 (1977), the
court of appeals implied that the victim's past sexual behavior may be admissible to
prove bias under R.C.W. § 9.79.150, while simultaneously affirming that past sexual
behavior is "inadmissible on the issue of credibility." It appears that the court implicit-
ly distinguished an attack based upon bias or motive from an attack on general credi-
bility and believed that the statute did not reach the former. A clearer statement of
such a distinction could provide a judicial gloss that would cure the constitutional de-
fect.
47. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
48. Under the voucher rule as applied in Chambers, the party who calls a witness
vouches for the witness' credibility and is prevented from impeaching his testimony,
even though the interests of the witness may be adverse to those of the party who
called him. Id. at 296-98.
49. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
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right to confrontation. Because Davis addressed the defendant's right
to impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness by revealing his
potential bias, it is particularly relevant to the constitutionality of
those portions of R.C.W. § 9.79.150 which completely prohibit the
use of past sexual behavior to impeach credibility.
In Davis, the defendant was on trial for burglary. Green, the prin-
cipal witness for the prosecution, was on probation from juvenile
court, also for burglary. On Green's property, police found a safe
stolen in the burglary at issue. When they questioned him about it, he
identified the defendant as one of the persons who had placed it there.
At trial, defense counsel sought to introduce evidence of Green's pro-
bationary status, not to raise doubt about his veracity, but to show
that Green had a motive to identify the defendant falsely. The trial
court held that state law5 0 governing juvenile records required exclu-
sion, regardless of the manner of impeachment. Davis challenged the
exclusion as a denial of his sixth amendment right to confront the wit-
ness.
To determine whether the scope of cross-examination had been
unconstitutionally limited by the lower court, Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the majority, applied a balancing test. Against the state's
interest in suppressing the evidence, the Chief Justice weighed the pur-
pose of the line of questioning, the probative value of the evidence
offered, and the impact it was likely to have on the prosecution's case.
He found that the purpose of the questioning was not to attack general
credibility but to reveal Green's potential bias, and cited Wigmore for
the proposition that the bias or partiality of a witness is always rele-
vant to credibility.5 ' The Chief Justice indicated that Green's juvenile
record could plausibly have created a motive to lie,52 and because
Green was a key witness, cross-examination as to his probationary
status could have done "[s] erious damage to the strength of the
State's case." 53 Finally, the Chief Justice examined the state's interest
in preserving the anonymity of juvenile offenders 54 and concluded
50. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(g) (1971); ALAS. R. CHILDREN'S P. 23.
51. 415 U.S. at316(citing 3AJ. WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 940).
52. Chief Justice Burger found that the witness' juvenile records could have cre-
ated an inference of undue pressure because of his "vulnerable status as a probation-
er," id. at 3 18, or an inference that he might have lied out of fear that he was a sus-
pect. Id.
53. Id. at 319.
54. The state argued that failure to suppress the evidence "would likely cause
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that "the State's desire that Green fulfill his public duty to testify free
from embarrassment and with his reputation unblemished must fall
before the right of petitioner to seek out the truth in the process of
defending himself." 55
When an exclusionary rule such as R.C.W. § 9.79.150 prevents a
rape defendant from arguing that the victim's sexual history creates a
bias on her part against the defendant, the fact situation is closely an-
alogous to Davis. In a rape trial, the victim is virtually always the key
prosecution witness. Facts suggestive of bias, partiality, or self-interest
on her part will always be relevant to her credibility and could seri-
ously weaken the prosecution's case. Finally, when the defendant has
a plausible basis for a bias attack, it is doubtful that Washington's in-
terest in protecting rape victims and encouraging reporting is any
more compelling a limitation on cross-examination than Alaska's in-
terest in protecting juveniles.5 6 To avoid a constitutional challenge
based on Davis,5 7 R.C.W. § 9.79.150(2) should be modified to allow
use of the victim's sexual history for the limited purpose of proving
bias, motive, or prejudice. 58
impairment of rehabilitative goals of the juvenile correctional procedures" which
might in turn "encourage the juvenile offender to commit further acts of delinquency
... or otherwise suffer unnecessarily for his youthful transgression." Id.
55. Id. at 320.
56. Cf. State v. DeLawder, 28 Md. App. 212, 344 A.2d 446 (1975) in which the
Maryland court held that under Davis, it was unconstitutional to prevent a defendant
on trial for statutory rape from cross-examining the complaining witness about her
past sexual behavior in order to reveal bias, merely to spare her the attendant em-
barrassment.
57. It could also be argued that Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973),
would support a constitutional challenge of the ban on sexual history to attack credi-
bility based on fundamental due process grounds. The factual situation in Chambers
is sufficiently distinguishable to make its application in this context doubtful. See notes
24-28 and accompanying text supra. In Davis, the court did not cite Chambers, but
relied on confrontation clause cases, e.g., Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968);
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
58. Although the majority did not specifically limit its holding to cross-examina-
tion for bias or motive, Justice Stewart stressed in his concurring opinion that "the
Court neither holds nor suggests that the Constitution confers a right in every case
to impeach the general credibility of a witness through cross-examination about his
past delinquency adjudications or criminal convictions." 415 U.S. at 311. Subsequent
to Davis, four state courts addressed the specific question whether juvenile records
could be admitted to attack general credibility; all four held that this was impermis-
sible. Gonzales v. State, 521 P.2d 512 (Alas.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974);
State v. Williams, 309 So. 2d 303 (La. 1975); State v. Burr, 18 Or. App. 494, 525
P.2d 1067 (1974); Warren v. State, 514 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Crim. 1974). In Gonzales,
the court discussed the difference between impeachment of general credibility and
impeachment for bias:
The attempted impeachment here was of general credibility by proof of prior
"convictions." The probative value of this type of evidence is considerably less
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Admission of the victim's past sexual behavior for a specific and
limited attack on credibility can be accomplished without significantly
diluting the protection that the present statute offers a testifying
victim. By adopting the procedural requirements of R.C.W. §
9.79.150(3)(a)-(d) to screen sexual history offered to attack credibil-
ity,5 9 the interests of both the victim and the defendant can be safe-
guarded. The procedure requires an in camera examination of the
proffered evidence and incorporates a balancing test similar to the one
employed in Davis to determine the admissibility of sexual history.
The trial court is directed to consider the relevance of the victim's
behavior to the issue, the possibility that undue prejudice to the victim
might substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence, and
whether exclusion would do "substantial justice" to the accused.
Under this test, the threshold requirement for admission is proba-
tive value. If evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior is found to
be probative of bias or motive, the judge cannot exclude it unless it is
unduly prejudicial60 and its undue prejudice substantially outweighs its
probative value. If prejudice and probative value are equal, the evi-
dence should come in under the statutory test. This result would bring
R.C.W. § 9.79.150 more in accord with prior case law allowing cross-
examination for bias or motive as a matter of right. 61 Even under
prior case law, Washington courts conscientiously restricted inquiries
than that which suggests false or distorted testimony because of bias. The need to
confront a witness with such evidence is correspondingly less.
It is apparent then that juvenile adjudications which are . . . directed solely
at general credibility rather than bias, are generally not sufficiently probative to
create a genuine conflict with the defendant's right of confrontation.
521 P.2d at 514-15. It is even more apparent that evidence of the sexual history of
the rape victim, introduced solely to attack general credibility rather than to show
bias, is "not sufficiently probative to create a genuine conflict with the defendant's
right of confrontation." Id.
59. The procedural requirements in this section were adopted to screen past sexual
behavior offered to prove consent. They are set forth fully in note 2, supra. In State
v. Blum, 17 Wn. App. 37, 561 P.2d 226 (1977), the rape defendant claimed that the
pretrial motion requirement in R.C.W. § 9.79.150(3) denied him procedural due
process. The court of appeals held that this requirement was no more offensive than
a motion in linine, and did not violate due process, because the defendant was not
prejudiced by having presented his evidence before trial.
60. The statute does not define undue prejudice but the promulgators may have
had in mind the concept of unfair prejudice referred to in Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The Advisory Committee's Note defines "unfair prejudice" as "an
undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not
necessarily, an emotional one." FED. R. Evi6. 403, Advisory Committee's Note.
61. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
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into bias or motive which seemed irrelevant.6 2 There is no reason to
believe judges would be less diligent if discretion is returned to them
for this limited statutory purpose.63
III. CONSENT
Evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior is admissible to prove
consent under the procedures in R.C.W. § 9.79.150(3)(a)-(d).6 4 The
new statute appears to be based on several legislative assumptions:
62. See note 42 and accompanying text supra. The majority opinion in Davis also
affirmed "the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harass-
ing interrogation." 415 U.S. at 316. In response to appeals based on Davis, recent
federal court decisions have reaffirmed the discretion of the trial court judge to limit
cross-examination that is likely to be minimally productive. United States v. Marshall,
526 F.2d 1349, 1361 (9th Cir. 1975) (permissible to deny defendant the right to ask
the witness the same questions asked at an earlier suppression hearing on grounds that
the evidence was speculative and only marginally relevant); United States v. Bastone,
526 F.2d 971, 981 (7th Cir. 1975) (additional questioning as to witness' state of
mind properly excluded as cumulative); United States v. Finkelstein, 526 F.2d 517,
529 (2d Cir. 1975) (in absence of Brady material, continued questioning about a
promise not to prosecute was merely speculative); Flemmi v. Gunter, 410 F. Supp.
1361, 1371-72 (D. Mass. 1976) (evidence that witness had been indicted for a more
serious charge than the one to which he eventually pleaded guilty properly excluded
as cumulative where defense counsel had already examined witness in detail about
the plea).
63. See State v. Blum, 17 Wn. App. 37, 46, 561 P.2d 226, 231 (1977), in which
the trial court ruled that evidence of a rape defendant's sexual relationship with the
defendant's cousin was inadmissible because it "failed to establish even an inference
of animosity or possible motive." The California legislature adopted a screening
process similar to the one proposed in this note in the Robbins Rape Evidence Law,
CAL. EVID. CODE § 782 (West Supp. 1977). It provides that a defendant may always
offer evidence to attack the credibility of a complaining witness, but if the evidence
consists of past sexual conduct, there must be a written offer of proof and the evi-
dence can be admitted only after a hearing in camera to determine its relevancy. Id.
The constitutionality of the California statute was subsequently attacked by a rape
defendant who was prevented from introducing evidence of the victim's unchastity.
People v. Blackburn, 56 Cal. App. 3d 685, 128 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1976). He argued
that the procedural requirements were unconstitutionally vague because they lacked a
standard for the sufficiency of the offer of proof. He further contended that by requir-
ing an offer of proof before he presented his testimony, the statute denied him the
privilege against self-incrimination. Both arguments were rejected.
64. See note 2 supra. The evidentiary section of the bill is a modification of the
original proposal formulated by the Seattle Women's Commission. The Commission
initially took the strong stand that: "past marital or sexual history or general reputa-
tion, tending to show promiscuity, chastity or non-chastity, is irrelevant to the issue
of consent or the issue of credibility and should be inadmissible in evidence." Seattle
Women's Commission, A Study on Rape in the City of Seattle, at 5 (1974) (unpub-
lished report on file at the Seattle Public Library). In keeping with this view, they
proposed including the following language in the new law: "(2) Evidence of the vic-
tim's general reputation for promiscuity, non-chastity, or sexual mores, or of specific
acts related thereto, is inadmissible to prove the victim's consent to the offense and
is inadmissible on the issue of credibility." Subst. H.B. 208 (Feb. 28, 1975 reading).
This earlier version made an exception when the defendant and the victim had en-
1027
Washington Law Review Vol. 52: 1011, 1977
there may be cases in which the victim's past sexual conduct with
third parties is probative of consent; in some cases the probative value
will not be outweighed by prejudice to the victim; in those cases, it
may be unconstitutional to prohibit the evidence entirely. The validity
of these assumptions is open to serious question. In reality, sexual his-
tory is rarely more than minimally probative of consent; prejudice to
the victim is almost always substantial; and there is no consitutional
requirement that such evidence be admitted.
A. Relevance
The prior Washington statute resembled rape laws in most jurisdic-
tions in that the victim's lack of consent was an essential element of
the crime. 65 Because there are seldom eyewitnesses to a rape, consent
usually had to be inferred from circumstantial evidence. The victim's
sexual history was one factor offered by rape defendants to raise the
inference that the victim consented. Whether this was a permissible
inference was the subject of considerable debate.66 Most courts held
that a woman's general reputation for unchastity was both relevant
and admissible to prove consent. They reasoned that a bad reputation
gaged in intercourse before, and that fact was material to consent.
Although there is no official legislative history to reveal the reason for the change
in the bill as it was ultimately passed, a Women's Commission member who took an
active part in the formulation of the measure stated that the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary questioned the constitutionality of the near total exclusion of sexual history
in the original version. Telephone interview with Jackie Griswold, in Seattle (Sept.
21, 1976). Ms. Griswold viewed the amendment allowing limited admission of past
sexual history to show consent as an acceptable compromise, necessary to the passage
of the legislation as a whole. Id. Patricia H. Aitken, Deputy Prosecutor for King
County, who supported the original version of the bill, concluded that rape victims
were better off under the prior case law than under the statute as enacted. In her view,
R.C.W. § 9.79.150 legitimizes the use of past sexual behavior to prove consent by ex-
pressly making it possible for the evidence to be admitted for that purpose. Interview
with Patricia H. Aitken, Deputy Prosecutor for King County. in Seattle (Sept. 14.
1976). The consent standard is analyzed more fully in Comment, Towvards a Consent
Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 613, 638 (1976), and Comment.
Indicia of Consent? A Proposal for Change to the Common Law Rule Admitting
Evidence of a Rape Victim's Character for Chastity, 7 Loy. CHI. L.J. 118 (1976).
65. The prior statute defined rape as "an act of sexual intercourse with a female
not the wife of the perpetrator committed against her will and without her consent."
1909 Wash. Laws, ch. 249, § 183 (repealed 1975) (formerly codified at R.C.W. §
9.79.010).
66. The arguments for and against admitting past sexual history to show consent
were developed in turn-of-the-century case law. Although various jurisdictions have
vacillated between the two positions, the basic arguments have remained the same.
See notes 67-70 and accompanying text infra. The significant change in this area of
the law is legislation designed to protect rape victims. See note I supra.
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implied repeated acts of unchastity, which, in turn, increased the like-
lihood that the victim had consented to the defendant. 67
Courts were divided, however, on the admissibility of evidence of
specific sexual acts between the victim and others to prove consent. 68
Some courts admitted evidence of specific sexual acts, arguing that the
virgin must be distinguished from the prostitute and that a virtuous
woman would be far less likely to give her consent than would a licen-
tious one.69 The majority of courts disagreed; they excluded evidence
of specific acts on the theory that prior consent to one or more indi-
viduals was minimally probative of later consent to the defendant.
Furthermore, in their view, whatever probative force there might be
was more than outweighed by the evils of confusion of issues, preju-
dice to the witness, and unfair surprise.70
Washington courts generally followed the majority rule, excluding
specific acts, but admitting general reputation for unchastity to prove
consent.71 Early decisions were handed down with little discussion.
The Washington Supreme Court continued steadfastly to maintain
that specific acts of unchastity were inadmissible to prove consent,72
and began to question as well the advisability of admitting evidence of
67. See Annot., 140 A.L.R. 364, 3 80-82 (1942).
68. See id. at 380-90 (1942); 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 200, in which the
author observed: "No question of evidence has been more controverted."
69. The most widely quoted language illustrating the argument appears in an early
New York case:
[A] nd are we to be told that previous prostitution shall not make one among
those circumstances which raise a doubt of assent? that the triers should be ad-
vised to make no distinction in their minds between the virgin and a tenant of the
stew? between one who would prefer death to pollution, and another who, in-
cited by lust and lucre, daily offers her person to the indiscriminate embraces of
the other sex?
... And will you not more readily infer assent in the practised Messalina, in
loose attire, than in the reserved and virtuous Lucretia?
People v. Abbott, 19 Wend. 192, 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838). The language of other
early courts in support of this position approached hyperbole. For a collection of
quotations jn this vein, see Note, Limitations on the Right to Introduce Evidence
Pertaining to the Prior Sexual History of the Complaining Witness in Cases of Forci-
ble Rape: Reflections of Reality or Denial of Due Process?, 3 HoFsTrA, L. REv. 403
n.3 (1975). Although most women today fall somewhere between the extremes pre-
sented by these courts (see note 80 and accompanying text infra), nevertheless the
argument still is given credence in modern decisions.
70. See cases cited in 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 200, especially Rice v. State,
35 Fla. 236, 17 So. 286 (1895).
71. E.g., State v. Sevems, 13 Wn. 2d 542, 125 P.2d 659 (1942); State v. Holcomb,
73 Wash. 652, 132 P. 416 (1913).
72. State v. Ring, 54 Wn. 2d 250, 254, 339 P.2d 461, 464 (1959). The court cited
State v. Severns, 13 Wn. 2d 542, 125 P.2d 659 (1942), which merely stated the com-
mon law rule. Id.
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the victim's general reputation for this purpose.73 Recent dicta from
the court of appeals indicated that sexual history in either form should
be completely inadmissible to prove consent.74 The court of appeals
stated that specific acts of sexual misconduct have little or no relation-
ship to the victim's alleged consent to the intercourse, 75 and in the
usual case, reputation evidence of chastity has little relevance to the
issue of consent.76
73. In State v. Allen, 66 Wn. 2d 641, 643, 404 P.2d 18, 19 (1965), the Washing-
ton Supreme Court stated that neither reputation evidence of unchastity nor specific
acts of unchastity were admissible to prove consent.
74. State v. Geer, 13 Wn. App. 71, 533 P.2d 389 (1975). See note 36 supra for
the facts of the Geer case.
The Geer decision turned upon another point. Geer admitted his use of force but
still claimed that the victim consented. The court held, however, that given the defen-
dant's admission together with corroborating evidence of his use of force, the victim's
submission could hardly be considered consensual. As a result, her sexual history was
simply not relevant.
It was not clear in Geer whether it was necessary for the defendant to admit to us-
ing force in order to remove consent as an issue, or whether the allegation of force,
together with corroborative evidence (bruises, broken bones, lacerations), was suf-
ficient to preclude a consent defense. If an admission by the defendant was required,
then few victims will benefit from Geer, particularly if defendants are represented by
competent counsel. For a discussion of the tactics of the consent defense, see Hibey,
The Trial of a Rape Case: An Advocate's Analysis of Corroboration, Consent, and
Character, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 309, 321-25 (1973).
The idea that the prosecution should not have the additional burden of proving
lack of consent where there is evidence of use of force by the defendant is reflected
in the definitions of the various degrees of rape under the new statute. Forcible com-
pulsion, defined supra note 4, replaces lack of consent as an essential element of first
degree rape. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.170 (1976). In second degree rape, the essential
element is either forcible compulsion or lack of capacity to consent on the part of the
victim. Id. § 9.79.180. Only in third degree rape is the victim's lack of consent an ele-
ment of the crime:
(1) A person is guilty of rape in the third degree when, under circumstances
not constituting rape in the first or second degrees, such person engages in sexual
intercourse with another person, not married to the perpetrator:
(a) Where the victim did not consent as defined in RCW 9.79.140(6) to sexual
intercourse with the perpetrator and such lack of consent was clearly expressed
by the victim's words or conduct, or
(b) Where there is threat of substantial unlawful harm to property rights of
the victim.
Id. § 9.79.190. The definition of consent in R.C.W. § 9.79.140(6) is set forth at note
4 supra.
Under these definitions, the victim's sexual history should be irrelevant to prove first
or second degree rape, but this is not the case. By denying that he used force and
asserting that the victim consented, the defendant places consent at issue, even in first
degree rape. He can then move to admit the victim's prior sexual behavior under
R.C.W. § 9.79.150(3).
75. 13 Wn. App. at 73-74, 533 P.2d at 391.
76. Id. at 74, 533 P.2d at 391. The court distinguished attempted rape cases on
the theory that: "Attempted rape requires the specific intent to rape. The accused's
subjective belief that the prosecutrix would consent to intercourse may refute that
specific intent. Hence, chastity reputation evidence may be relevant to the issue of the
accused's state of mind." Id. at 74 n.1, 533 P.2d at 391 n.l.
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The new statute does not distinguish between specific acts and rep-
utation for unchastity, but permits the use of either form of evidence
to prove consent if it passes the balancing test in R.C.W. §
9.79.150(3)(a)-(d).7 7 As discussed earlier,78 the balancing test favors
admission. If the judge is convinced that the evidence is probative, it
can be admitted unless the prejudice it engenders substantially out-
weighs its probative value. This is apparently the case even if the prof-
fered evidence consists of specific acts with third parties, which would
have been inadmissible under the prior case law. The new statute thus
significantly restricts the protection previously available to rape
victims.
Under the new law, it is critical to determine whether past sexual
activity with a third party is in fact probative of consent to the de-
fendant. Early cases give little guidance because they viewed victims
in moralistic terms, in effect rewarding the virtuous and condemning
the unchaste.79 Even modem courts have failed to address this ques-
tion in light of contemporary moral standards. Statistically, premarital
intercourse is likely to be the rule and not the exception;8 0 however,
77. These subsections are set forth fully in note 2 supra. It is unclear under the
new law who has the burden of proving consent to the defendant in cases of first and
second degree rape. The definition of consent in R.C.W. § 9.79.140(6) requires that
the victim indicate her consent by affirmative acts. See note 4 supra. If she fails to do
so, she has not consented, and the defendant assumes consent at his own risk. Since
consent is not an element of first and second degree rape, the burden should be on
the defendant to prove that the victim consented. Lack of consent is an element of
third degree rape, and the language defining lack of consent appears to place the
burden of proof squarely on the prosecutor. According to R.C.W. § 9.79.190(I)(a),
the victim must clearly express lack of consent by her words or conduct. If she fails
to do so, then presumably she has consented. Prior Washington case law holding that
the burden of proving lack of consent in a rape case always falls on the prosecution
will probably be controlling. See, e.g., State v. Chambers, 50 Wn. 2d 139, 309 P.2d
1055 (1957); State v. Thomas, 9 Wn. App. 160, 510 P.2d 1137 (1973). Paul J. Bern-
stein, Deputy Prosecutor for King County, Washington, stated that the new statute
does not shift the burden of proving consent to the defendant in first and second de-
gree rape. Telephone interview with Paul J. Bernstein, Deputy Prosecutor for King
County, Washington, in Seattle (October 21, 1976). The Battelle researchers con-
cluded that the issue was in doubt. Battelle Legal Analysis, supra note 1, at 29-30.
78. See discussion regarding use of the test to screen sexual history offered to at-
tack credibility in text accompanying notes 59-63 supra.
79. See, e.g., People v. Abbott, 19 Wend. 192, 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838), quoted
at note 69 supra.
80. Two Johns Hopkins professors surveyed young women representing a national
probability sample of the 15-19 year-old female population of the United States. Of
the 4240 never-married young women interviewed, 46% had experienced intercourse
by age 19. Zelnick & Kantner, Sexual Experience of Young Unmarried Women, 4
FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 9 (1972). The figure increases with the age of the
women in the sample. A nationwide survey of sexual behavior conducted in 1972 iso-
lated the responses of white single women from the total of 1044 women respondents.
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women generally confine themselves to one partner.8 1 It is difficult to
see how the victim's discriminating exercise of sexual choice with one
partner has any predictive value in determining whether she consented
to a different individual, the defendant.
But what of the case of the promiscuous woman who consents to
intercourse indiscriminately? 82 Leaving aside the problems of preju-
dice inherent in attempting to prove her promiscuity and considering
only the relevance of her conduct, is her pattern of behavior suffi-
ciently predictable to raise the inference that she consented to the de-
fendant at the time in question? Some commentators argue that even
in the extreme case, "human behavior is far too complex to allow for
any great correlation between past behavior and behavior in respect to
a particular event."' 83 The trend, however, is for courts to find evi-
dence relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a mate-
rial fact more or less probable. 84 Under this definition of relevance,
the sexual history of a promiscuous woman may be minimally rele-
vant to consent. But if one concedes minimal relevance in this case,
the problem then becomes how to prove promiscuity.
The court could allow the defendant to call a parade of witnesses,
each testifying to specific acts of intercourse with the victim. 85 That
In this category, nearly three-quarters of the women had had intercourse by age 25.
M. HUNT, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE 1970's 149 (1974).
8 1. Three-fifths of the sexually experienced young women in the Zelnick & Kantner
study had had only one partner. Zelnick & Kantner, supra note 80, at 10. About half
reported that they had intercourse only with the person they intended to marry. Id.
82. One proponent of new rape legislation, discussing the reluctance of rape vic-
tims to report the crime, likened the sexually promiscuous woman to a philanthropic
robbery victim and hypothesized the following cross examination:
. . . Have you ever been held up before?"
"No."
"Have you ever given money away?"
"Yes, of course."
"And you did so willingly?"
"What are you getting at?"
"Well, let's put it like this, Mr. Smith. You've given money away in the past.
In fact, you have quite a reputation for philanthropy. How can we be sure you
weren't contriving to have your money taken...?T
The Legal Bias against Rape Victims, 61 A.B.A.J. 464 (April 1975).
83. Battelle Legal Analysis, supra note 1, at 55. Accord, Comment, Rape and
Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 919. 939 (1973). But see
Note, Indiana's Rape Shield Law: Conflict with the Confrontation Clause?, 9 IND. L.
REV. 418, 427-31 (1976), in which the author distinguishes discriminating consent to
third parties from indiscriminate consent, and concludes that in the latter case. the
evidence is relevant.
84. See FED. R. EviD. 401, set forth fully in note 8 supra.
85. Although Wigmore and others argue that this evidence is necessary to counter
false claims of rape by alleged victims, I J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 924a, few com-
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alternative, however, was expressly rejected by Washington courts
long before R.C.W. § 9.79.150 was enacted, because of the prejudi-
cial effects of such evidence and the fear that such a procedure would
encourage subornation of perjury. 86 Alternatively, the court could
allow the defendant to introduce reputation evidence showing the vic-
tim's lack of chastity, but that course is not without difficulties. Not
only is the evidence collalteral and prejudicial, but its probative value
is questionable. It is further removed in the chain of inference than
specific acts with third parties, and it is frequently based on hearsay
which may be motivated by malice. Furthermore, the concept of
chastity itself is changing. When a witness testifies that the victim's
reputation for chastity is bad, he could mean either that she is a pros-
titute,87 or that it is rumored she stayed out late one night with a male
friend. In sum, the victim's lack of chastity is essentially collateral to
the issue of the defendant's guilt, as well as highly prejudicial to the
prosecution's case. The wisest course would be to exclude completely
evidence both of specific acts with third parties and of reputation for
chastity on the issue of consent. 88
mentators have addressed the possibility of fabrication by defendants or by witnesses
called on their behalf. If specific instances of the victim's unchastity are admissible at
trial, the possibility of subornation of perjury by defendants who have convinced
friends to testify against the victim seems almost as likely as the possibility that the
victim will testify falsely. At least one early Washington court adhered to this view in
rejecting evidence of specific acts of unchastity. State v. Holcomb, 73 Wash. 652, 658,
132 P. 416, 418 (1913).
86. State v. Severns, 13 Wn. 2d 542, 125 P.2d 659 (1942); State v. Pierson, 175
Wash. 650, 27 P.2d 1068 (1933); State v. Holcomb, 73 Wash. 632, 132 P. 416 (1913).
87. In Haynes v. State, 498 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Crim. 1973), the court rejected
reputation evidence where the victim was a prostitute, stating: "Even if it had been
shown that prosecutrix was a prostitute, this would not have proved consent, or made
her any the less the subject of rape by force. A prostitute does not lose the right of
choice, and may consent or not consent according to her own will." 498 S.W.2d at 952.
88. Ten state legislatures have opted to prohibit the use of the victim's past sexual
conduct on the issue of consent. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(2) (West Supp. 1977);
DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 3509 (Supp. 1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-32.5-1 (Bums
1976); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.788(10) (Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
94-5-503(5) (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-14 (1976); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2907.02(D) (Page Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 750 (West Supp.
(1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.475 (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 972.11(2)(b) (West
Supp. 1977). California, in addition, has prohibited use of an instruction which al-
lowed the jury to infer that a woman who had previously consented would be likely to
consent again:
In any criminal prosecution for the crime of rape, . . . or for an attempt to com-
mit, or assault with intent to commit, any such crime, the jury shall not be in-
structed that it may be inferred that a female who has previously consented to
sexual intercourse with persons other than the defendant would be therefore more
likely to consent to sexual intercourse again.




A growing number of legislatures have voted to bar the use of the
victim's sexual history with third parties to prove consent. 89 Their ac-
tions amount to a legislative determination that past sexual conduct is
never sufficiently probative to overcome the prejudice it creates in the
minds of jurors. The constitutionality of these statutes has been at-
tacked by commentators who claim that the blanket exclusion of
sexual history to prove consent violates the due process rights of rape
defendants. 90 First, such commentators contend that past sexual his-
tory is more than minimally relevant to consent.91 They then read
Davis v. Alaska,9 2 or Chambers v. Mississippi93 and Davis combined,
as a mandate for admission of relevant evidence favorable to the de-
fendant. 94 Both arguments are specious.
Only in the extreme case of the indiscriminately promiscuous
woman can it be argued that past sexual behavior with third persons is
even minimally relevant to consent. 95 Chambers and Davis involved
facts which made the excluded evidence highly relevant to a material
issue; therefore, neither case is apposite when applied to the exclusion
of sexual history to prove consent.
In Chambers, the defendant was charged with a murder to which
another man, McDonald, confessed. Chambers called McDonald to
testify, but McDonald recanted his confession and professed to have
an alibi for the night in question. Chambers was prevented from ex-
amining McDonald as an adverse witness by Mississippi's voucher
rule. 96 He was also prevented by the hearsay rule97 from calling wit-
nesses to attack McDonald's version of events. Justice Powell, writing
89. See note 88 supra.
90. Rudstein, supra note 1; Note, supra note 83; Note, supra note 69. Cf. Note,
Constitutional Restraints on the Exclusion of Evidence in the Defendant's Favor: The
Implications of Davis v. Alaska, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1465, 1489-90 n.ll0 (1975)
(commenting on FED. R. EVID. 609(b)).
91. Rudstein, supra note 1, at 22-23; Note, supra note 83, at 430 (habitual indis-
criminate sexual conduct is more than minimally relevant); Note, supra note 69, at
413-17.
92. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
93. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
94. Rudstein, supra note 1, at 18; Note, supra note 83, at 437.
95. See notes 82-84 and accompanying text supra.
96. See note 48 supra.
97. The witnesses would have testified to hearsay statements by McDonald which
were against his penal interest. Mississippi, however, recognized a hearsay exception
only for declarations against the witness' pecuniary interests and not for declarations
against penal interest. 410 U.S. at 299-301.
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for the Court, held that the combined effect of the two rules was to
deny Chambers due process.9 8 He emphasized that the constitutional
guarantee of due process encompasses both the right to confront wit-
nesses through cross-examination and the right to call witnesses on the
defendant's behalf.99 The bulk of his analysis, however, was devoted to
the evidentiary questions. He discussed the dubious validity of the
voucher rule and the trustworthiness of a declaration against penal
interest as an exception to the hearsay rule. Although he did not in-
validate either rule, he held that under the particular set of facts pre-
sented, they operated to deny Chambers a fair trial.100
Evidence of past sexual behavior to prove consent does not stand
on an equal footing with evidence of a third party confession. As in
Chambers, it is always relevant to prove that someone else committed
the crime for which the defendant is accused; short of eyewitness testi-
mony, a voluntary confession is the most persuasive proof of another's
guilt. Evidence that the victim consented may also exculpate the de-
fendant, but past sexual activity with others is, at best, weak evidence
of consent. 10 An admission by the victim that she consented would
have probative value equivalent to that of the confession in Cham-
bers, but past sexual activity with third parties does not. Given Justice
Powell's emphasis on the trustworthiness of the evidence involved and
his reluctance to state a general rule transcending the facts of the case,
it is unlikely Chambers poses a threat to the constitutionality of stat-
utes banning the use of past sexual history to prove consent.
Davis v. Alaska'0 2 dealt specifically with impeachment evidence
directed at the issue of bias; application of Davis in other contexts is
doubtful. Although it is possible to read Davis as a broad holding that
the defendant's right to confrontation will always override the state's
98. Id. at 302. Justice Powell concluded that the voucher rule "plainly interfered
with Chambers' right to defend against the State's charges," id. at 298, and that the
hearsay rule "may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice." Id. at
302.
99. Id. at 294. See Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Consti-
tutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 713, 788 (1976), where the
author points out that sixth amendment incorporation theory alone would not support
the result in Chambers. The right to call witnesses on the defendant's behalf is not
within the express provisions of the sixth amendment, but Justice Powell found it to
be essential to due process under the fourteenth amendment.
100. 410U.S. at 302-03.
101. Furthermore, evidence of past sexual activity creates the risk of undue pre-
judice. In the usual case, prejudice created by the admission of a confession stems
from its extreme relevance and therefore is not undue.
102. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
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interest in protecting the privacy of prosecution witnesses, this inter-
pretation ignores Chief Justice Burger's repeated emphasis on the
facts of the case.' 03 General statements by the Chief Justice about the
right of confrontation are all made within the narrower context of
impeachment for bias, 10 4 and the opinion is permeated with references
to a specific right to cross-examine for bias.105 Taken as a whole,
Davis is implicitly limited to impeachment for bias. 10 6
Even if one does not accept this implicit limitation, Davis does not
mandate admission of past sexual conduct to prove consent. Chief
Justice Burger implied that, given the suspicious circumstances pre-
ceding the statement of the key witness, his juvenile record was as
probative of bias as a prosecutor's promise of immunity or evidence of
coercive detention. 107 A rape victim's past sexual activity with third
parties is not equivalently probative of consent. Until the Court holds
that the exclusion of minimally relevant evidence violates the defend-
103. The Chief Justice stated: "In this setting [where the defendant sought to
cross-examine for bias and the evidence could have seriously damaged the prosecu-
tion's case] we conclude that the right of confrontation is paramount to the State's
policy of protecting ajuvenile offender." Id. at 319.
104. 415 U.S. at 316-19.
105. "Whatever temporary embarrassment might result to Green or his family by
disclosure of his juvenile record . . . is outweighed by petitioner's right to probe into
the influence of possible bias in the testimony of a crucial identification witness." Id.
at 319 (emphasis added). "The State's policy interest in protecting the confidentiality
of a juvenile offender's record cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional
right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness." Id. at 320
(emphasis added).
106. In practice, the narrow application of Davis has prevailed. Within the im-
peachment setting, state courts have further restricted Davis to impeachment for
bias, and have not applied it to allow impeachment of general credibility. See note 58
supra. They have been reluctant to apply Davis at all, outside the impeachment set-
ting. Cf. People v. Blackburn, 56 Cal. App. 3d 685, 128 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1976) (in-
admissibility of evidence of specific instances of victim's sexual conduct with others
is not a denial of due process). But see State v. Hembd, 232 N.W.2d 872 (Minn.
1975) (Davis required that statutory doctor-patient privilege must give way to the
defendant's right to confrontation). Davis is most likely to be applied in cases which
parallel its facts. United States v. Garrett, 542 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1976) (permissible
to show witness, a policeman, had been suspended under suspicion of using drugs be-
cause he might have cooperated in order to lift the suspension); United States v.
Croucher, 532 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1976) (evidence that prior charges had been dis-
missed in exchange for the witness' cooperation admissible to show testimony might
have been biased); Moynahan v. Manson, 419 F. Supp. 1139 (D. Conn. 1976) (wit-
ness' involvement in same criminal scheme as defendant admissible to show bias);
State v. Robinson, 337 So.2d 1168 (La. 1976) (permissible to use arrest records to
show bias even though not admissible under state law to impeach general credibility);
People v. Tyler, 54 App. Div. 2d 723, 387 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1976) (evidence that wit-
ness' mandatory life sentence was waived in exchange for lifetime probation admis-
sible to show motive to lie); Smith v. State, 541 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Crim. 1976)
(evidence of plea bargaining admissible to show bias, prejudice, or ulterior motive).
107. 415 U.S. at 318-20 (citing Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (193 1)).
1036
Rape Evidence Law
ant's right to confrontation, statutes banning the use of the victim's
sexual history to prove consent are safe from constitutional attack.' 08
IV. CONCLUSION
As an exclusionary rule Washington's new rape evidence law is
both too broad and too narrow. By totally excluding evidence of the
victim's past sexual behavior to attack the credibility of the victim, the
statute conflicts with the ruling in Davis v. Alaska. R.C.W. §
9.79.150(3) should be redrafted to allow the admission of past sexual
history to prove bias or motive, subject to the hearing procedure es-
tablished in subsections (a)-(d).
On the other hand, the victim's past sexual history should be totally
excluded on the issue of consent. Past sexual history is at most mini-
mally probative on this issue and neither Davis nor Chambers v. Mis-
sissippi mandates the admission of minimally probative evidence.
Rape laws have always involved the balancing of victims' and de-
fendants' rights. Washington's rape evidence law is part of a compre-
hensive attempt by the legislature to correct an imbalance favoring the
defendant. The suggested changes in R.C.W. § 9.79.150(2) and (3)
may be a further step toward equilibrium, providing a balance be-
108. Two state courts have addressed the question whether exclusion of sexual
history to prove consent violates due process. In People v. Blackburn, 56 Cal. App.
3d 685, 128 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1976), the defendant charged that California's law com-
pletely prohibiting use of past sexual history to show consent denied him due process
under Davis. In response the California Court of Appeals pointed out that even rele-
vant information is barred for policy reasons, and that policy considerations "are
deemed incorporated within the definition of a fair trial." Id. at 689, 128 Cal. Rptr. at
866. The court specifically cited rules barring hearsay, opinion evidence, and privileged
communications. In contrast to the evidence barred under these rules, the California
court concluded that the relevance of sexual history is slight at best, id. at 692, 128
Cal. Rptr. at 867, and held that the constitutional challenge was without merit.
In State v. Hill, 244 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. 1976), the defendant claimed that limita-
tion of cross-examination as to the victim's past sexual behavior to prove consent
under a statutory procedure similar to that in R.C.W. § 9.79.150(3) denied him the
right of confrontation. He relied on State v. Hembd, 232 N.W.2d 872 (Minn. 1975),
wherein Davis was applied to override a statutory doctor-patient privilege on con-
frontation clause grounds. (Hembd is criticized in Note, Constitutional Law: Davis v.
Alaska Applied to Hold that Physician-Patient Privilege Must Give Way to Accused's
Right to Confrontation, 60 MINN. L. REv. 1086 (1976)). The Minnesota Supreme
Court declined to apply Hembd and instead found as a matter of law "that the pro-
ferred evidence of complainant's prior cohabitation with two men did not have suffici-
ent probative value in the context of this case to permit its introduction on the issue
of whether or not she consented to sexual relations with this defendant." 244 N.W.2d




tween the interests of victim and defendant that will benefit society by
increasing the likelihood that legitimate rape cases will come to trial
and result in conviction.
Evelyn Sroufe
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